In as emi-naturalistic response-effect compatibility paradigm, participants wereg iven the opportunity to learn that hand-shaking actions would be followed by social effects (human hand-shaking stimuli from at hird-person perspective) or inanimate effects (block arrow stimuli). Relative to the actions, these effects appeared on the same or the opposite side of the screen (positional compatibility), and pointed towards or away from the response hand (directional compatibility). After learning, response times indicated ap ositional compatibility effect for both social and inanimate effects, but a directional compatibility effect occurred only for social action effects. These findings indicate that actions can be represented, not only by their effects on the inanimate world, but also by their effects on the actions of others. They are consistent with ideomotor theory, and with the view that actions are represented by bidirectional response-effect associations. They also have implications with respect to the origins and on-line control of imitation and the systems supporting imitation.
by contiguitya nd contingency (Rescorla, 1968) ,t hese results imply that the sensory consequencesofaction acquire the capacity to represent action via associative learning. Furthermore, since effect stimuli were presented after responses in the acquisition phase,b ut before responses in the test phase, Elsnera nd Hommel'sfi ndings suggest that the associative learning which integrates effect stimuli into action representations is bidirectional rather than unidirectional:i tg ives rise to links between response and effect stimulus representations which ensure that activationofeach is propagated to the other.
In the present study,weused aresponse-effect compatibility paradigm similar to the one developed by Kunde (2001 Kunde ( ,2003 Koch &Kunde, 2002; Kunde et al.,2004) tofind out whether social, as well as inanimate, effectsc an acquire the capacity to represent actions,a nd to investigate whether associations betweenr esponsesa nd their social effects are learned more or less readily than associations between responses and their inanimate effects. Associative learning is ar elativelyd omain-general process, which forges connections between event representations according to their contiguity and contingency,b ut often regardless of the type or identity of the represented events (Seligman &H ager,1 972; cf. Garcia &K oelling, 1966) .T herefore, if the process that generates action effect representations is associative learning, one would not expect it to be biased intrinsically towards the formation of eitheri nanimate or social effect representations (Heyes, Bird, Johnson, &H aggard, 2005; Press, Gillmeister,&Heyes, 2007) .H owever,i ti sp ossible that the integration process is biased towards either inanimate or social stimuli by attentional or perceptual mechanisms. For example, if, in everyday life, novel inanimate stimuli aremorelikely to require action than novel social stimuli, then novel inanimate stimuli may be better able than novel social stimuli to capture attention and therefore to supportl earning. Alternatively, the components of the perceptual system that are dedicated to the processing of biological movement stimuli (e.g., Oram &Perrett, 1994; Thompson, Clarke, Stewart, &Puce, 2005) may give these stimuli privileged access to associative learning mechanisms, enablings ocial stimuli to acquire the capacity to represent action more readily than inanimate stimuli. Even if one sets aside the evidence that action effect representations are formed through domain-general processes of associativel earning, and assumes that theyare formed by dedicated mechanisms of motor learning, it remains unclear whether one would expect more effective learning of social or inanimate effect representations.I ft he dedicated mechanisms are adapted fori nstrumentala ction, then actions are likely to be represented primarily in terms of their inanimate effects, but if theya re adapted forc ommunicative functions, theya re likely to be represented primarily in terms of their social effects.
We used as emi-naturalistic response-effect paradigm to investigatet he representation of hand-shaking responses. In each trial, participants werep resented with amale or female face, which indicated whether theyshould use their left or right hand to 'shake hands' with ac entrally located paddle manipulandum. This response produced an action effect. In separate blocks of trials,t he action effect varied in its positional compatibility(same, or opposite, side of the screen as the response hand)and its directional compatibility( pointing towards, or away from,t he responseh and). Separate groups of participants observed social and inanimate effect stimuli. The social stimuli depicted ah uman hand, in as haking posture, and in directionallyc ompatible trials the stimuli therefore appearedtoshakehands with the participant. The inanimate stimuli were block arrows. We required separate groups of participants to undertake the task with their own responses visible and invisible. Thism anipulationw as used to determine whether exposure to proximal action effects, i.e., direct visual feedback from the response hand, modulated the influenceofthe distalaction effects on performance.
If participants can learntointegrate gross spatial properties of an effect, the left or right position of an imageo nacomputer screen, into their representations of handshaking actions, then responses should be faster when effectsa re positionally compatible, rather than positionally incompatible, with executedresponses. Similarly,if participants can learntoincorporate arelativelysubtle spatial property of an effect,the direction in which it points, into their representationo fh and-shaking actions, then responses should be faster when effectsa re directionally compatible, rather than directionally incompatible, with executed responses. Finally, if this learning, about gross or subtle spatial features of effect stimuli, occursmore or less readily whenthe response effect is social than whenitisinanimate, one would expect the influence of positional and/ord irectional compatibility to interactw ith the type of effect stimulus. For example, agreater disparity between compatible and incompatible trials with hand than with arrow stimuli would suggest that the properties of social stimuli are more readily integrated into effect representations than the properties of inanimate stimuli.
Method
Participants Atotal of 128 participants (18-35 years old) took partinthis study and were paid asmall honorarium. Theyw ere randomly assigned in equal numbers to groups who would observe hand effects and groups who would observe arrow effects. Half of the participants in each group could see their responses during testing, and the otherhalf could not see their responses. All were right-handed, hadnormal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were naive with respect to the purposeo ft he experiment. The study was approvedbythe local ethicscommittee, and performed in accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli
Responses were cued by astatic, coloured imageofamale or afemale face (MaxPlanck Institute forBiologicalCybernetics in Tü bingen, Germany,face database), presented in the centre of the screen and occupying approximately 5 8 of visual angle horizontally and 7 8 vertically. Correct responses were followed by presentation of as tatic, coloured imageofahuman hand or of ablock arrow.The hand and arrow stimuli were of similar hue and luminance, and each occupied approximately 4 8 of visual angle horizontally, and 2 8 vertically (seeF igure 1). The hand stimuli depictedaright or al eft hand approaching the participant in the posture that normally precedes hand shaking. The arrow stimuli pointed to the right or to the left. Both hand and arrow stimuli were presented on either the left or the right side of the screen.
Procedure
Participants were tested individuallyinadimly lit room. Approximately 1m in front of wherep articipants were standing was a4 0.5 cm CRT computer screeno nw hich the stimuli werep resented. Directly in front of the participant, on at able at upper thigh height, was ab oard bearing two responsek eys, 27 cm apart.T he manipulandum, a paddle, was situated between the responsek eysa nd the screen, and aligned with the centre of the participant'sb ody.I tc onsisted of aU SB logic 3j oystick,p added,a nd encased in ap addle-shaped envelope of soft, yellow fabric (20 cm high £ 7cmw ide £ 10 cm deep). The position of the paddle relative to the participant'sbody was similar to that of another person'sh and when shaken.
Between trials, participants depressed the leftkey with the indexfinger of their left hand, and the right keywith the indexfinger of their right hand.Each trial began with the words 'Be ready!', which were presentedi nt he centre of the screen fora tl east 500 ms, or until the participant was depressing bothr esponse keys. After ar andom stimuluso nset asynchronyo f5 00-1,000 ms, am ale or af emale face wasp resented. Participants were instructedt hat their task was to initiate differenth and-shaking movements to 'Phil' (the male face) and 'Liv' (the female face), and their attention was not drawn to the visual responseeffects; therefore theywere not explicitly instructed to shake handswith the model (indeed, the instructionwas the same regardless of whether there werehand or arrow effects). Half of the participants in each group were told that left-hand responses should be madetoPhil'sface and right-hand responses to Liv'sface. The other half weregiven the reverse stimulus-response assignment. To make the handshaking response, the participant was required to lift their right or left hand from the responsek ey,r each forwardw ith their hand in ap osture typicalo fh and shaking, and touch the side of the centrallylocated paddle so that it was displaced in the direction of the movement trajectory. Participants then returned their hand to its responsek ey. Ac orrect response (made with the appropriate hand,1 00-1,000 ms after stimulus onset) resulted in disappearance of the face stimulus and its replacement, 200 ms later, The effect types: in P þ D þ blocks, the effect was on the same side of the screen as the response and pointed towards the response; in P þ D 2 blocks, the effect was on the same side of the screen and pointed away from the response; in P 2 D þ blocks, the effect was on the opposite side of the screen as the response and pointed towards it; in P 2 D 2 blocks, the effect was on the opposite side of the screen and pointed away from it. Those in the hand-visible and hand-invisible groups observed hand effects (rows 2and 3) and those in the arrow-visible and arrow-invisible groups observed arrow effects (rows 4and 5).
by ah and or arrow stimulus for1 ,000ms, and af urther5 00 ms later,b yamale voice (in the case of the male stimulus) or afemale voice (in the case of the female stimulus) saying 'hello'.I ncorrect responses were followed by an error message, displayed for1 ,000ms, and the gender-appropriate voice saying 'oh'. Incorrect response trials were replaced at arandom positionlater in the sameblock. The inter-trial interval was 1,000 ms. There were four types of action effect, presented in separate blocks of 50 trials each: positionc ompatible and direction compatible (Pþ D þ ), positionc ompatible and direction incompatible (Pþ D 2 ), position incompatible and direction compatible (P2 D þ ), and position incompatible and direction incompatible (P 2 D 2 )(see Figure 1) . In P þ conditions, the action effect appeared on the same side of the screen as the responding arm( e.g., left side following left-armm ovements), and in P 2 conditions it appeared on the opposite side of the screen( e.g., right side following left-arm movements). In D þ conditions, the action effect pointed towards the responding arm( e.g., towards the left of the screen following left-armm ovements), and in D 2 conditions it pointed away from the responding arm( e.g., towards the right following left-armm ovements).
Participants completed two blocks of each type of trial (8 blocks, consisting of 400 correct trials, in total), and the order of block types was counterbalanced across participants according to aL atin square design. The first block of each type constituted the training block and the second the test block. At the end of each block, participants weret old the number of errorst heyh ad made in that block and given as core (maximum 100) reflecting their mean RT.
Results
The data from the test blocks were analysed using mean RT,based on correct responses with al atency between 100 and 1,000ms, as the dependent variable. These data were subjected to mixed-model ANOVA in which the within-subject variables were positional compatibility( P þ and P 2 )a nd directional compatibility (Dþ and D 2 ), and the between-subject variables were effect type (hand and arrow) and response visibility (visible and invisible). Thesed ata are presented in Table 1 , separately forP þ D þ ,P þ D 2 ,P 2 D þ ,a nd P 2 D 2 blocks, and separately forp articipants who observedt he hand and arrow effects, and undertook the experiment with their own responding handsv isibleo ri nvisible. All significant effectsa nd interactions are reportedb elow.T he same analysis applied to error frequency data didn ot yield any significant effects or interactions.
Ta ble 1. Mean RT (ms) in P þ D þ ,P þ D 2 ,P 2 D þ ,a nd P 2 D 2 blocks, separately for participants who observedthe hand and arrow effects, and undertook the experiment with their own responding hands visible or invisible: Values in brackets indicate the standard error of the mean
Hand ( There was also as ignificant two-wayi nteraction between effect type and response visibility [ F ð 1 ; 124Þ¼6 : 03, p ¼ : 015, see Figure 2c ], indicating that responseinvisibility slowed responding when the responsee ffectsw ere hands but notw hen theyw ere arrows. Given this two-way interaction, we repeated the analysis using RT as acovariate, to ensure that the directional compatibility £ effect type interaction did not depend on differences in RT between groups. This covariate analysis confirmed that there was a directional compatibility £ effect type interaction [ 
Discussion
In this study of action representation, participants weregiven the opportunity to learn relationships between hand-shaking responses and novel effect stimuli. The effect stimuli depicted either ahand in ashaking posture (social effect type) or ablock arrow (inanimate effect type). Theyw ere presented in (positional compatibility), or pointed towards (directional compatibility), the samel eft-right location as the hand-shaking response, or in the opposite location. After the learning phase, responses with effects that appeared on the same side of space were initiated faster than responses with effects that appeared on the opposite side of space.Thispositional compatibility effect didnot differ across effect types (social and inanimate), but it was present only in the group of participants who did not receive direct visual feedback from their responses. In addition, responses with effects that pointed towards the responding hand were initiated faster than responses with effectsthat pointed away from the responding hand. This directional compatibility effect was present when the effect stimuli were hands but not when theywere block arrows.Unlikethe positional compatibilityeffect,itwas not modulated by the availabilityofd irect visual feedback.
The positional compatibility effect observedi nt his experiment is similar to that reportedb yK unde (2001), in which keypress responses followed by the illumination of adjacent lights were initiated faster than keypress responses followed by the illumination of non-adjacent lights. Thus,i tc onfirms that participants can learn relationships betweenresponses and the gross spatial features of their effects, and that, as aconsequence of this learning, anticipation of those spatial features can 'prime' the selection of their associated responses. In our study,apositional compatibility effect occurred not only whent he effect stimuli were inanimate (arrows), as in Kunde's experiments, but also when theyw eres ocial (hands). Therefore, our results extend those of previousstudies by showing that participants can represent actions in terms of the gross spatial features of their effectseven when the effect stimuli depict the actions of others. The magnitudeofthe positional compatibility effect didnot varywith effect type, giving no evidence fors ocial effectsb eing more or less readily integrated into action representations than inanimate effects. The results of our directional compatibilitym anipulation showed fort he first time that the direction in which ah and is pointing can be integrated within action representations.T hisi sc onsistent with previous evidence that relativelys ubtle properties of stimuli are integrated within action representations. For example, in a study investigating object affordances, Tucker and Ellis (1998) showed that participants were faster to elicit right hand,r ather than lefth and,a ctions to objectst hat would be most easily grasped with the right hand (e.g., asaucepan with its handle pointing to the right). Furthermore, the fact that there was adirectional compatibilityeffect in the hand group, where the directionally compatible effects appeared to shake hands with the participant, but not in the arrow group, suggests that in our experiment these subtle features were incorporated in action representations, and therefore influenced response selection, only when theyw ere features of social, rather than inanimate, stimuli. Previous researchsuggests that the pointing direction of inanimate arrow effects can be incorporated into responser epresentations (Kunde, 2004) . Therefore, it is likely that with al onger acquisition phase, the directional effect would also have been observed with arrow stimuli, but social effect stimuli are integrated morerapidly.
There are anumber of potential explanations forthis difference betweensocial and inanimate effect stimuli. First, it is possible that, within the experiment, participants learned associations between responsesa nd the directional features of social stimuli more rapidly than relationships between responsesa nd the directional features of inanimate stimuli. This could be aconsequence of perceptual or attentional mechanisms giving social stimulus featuresprivileged access to associative learning. One reason that attentional mechanisms may have given social features privileged access to learning is that the instructiong iven to participants was to 'shake hands' with the model. As a consequence of these instructions, whether or not an effect stimulus appeared to shake hands mayhave been especially salientfor participants. Second, the directional features of the social stimuli may have had a' head start'; there may have been associations between hand-shaking responses and the directional features of their social effects prior to the experiment, either through innates pecification or because of learning in circumstances where people shake hands with one another. Finally,ifone assumes that action representations are learnedv ia dedicatedp rocesses of motor learning, rather than domain-general associative learning, then it is possible that these processes are adapted forc ommunicative functions, and therefore intrinsically biased towards learning relationships between responsesand their social effects.
Whatever the exact sourceofthe observed difference betweensocial and inanimate responsee ffects, it is noteworthy that the directional compatibilitye ffect fors ocial stimuli, unlikethe positional compatibilityf or bothstimulus types, wasstrong enough to withstand exposure to direct visual feedback. The positional compatibility effect was absent whenparticipants wereable to see their own hand and armmovements, but the directional compatibility effect fors ocial stimuli was not modulated by the visibility of the responses. Thissuggests that the availability of direct visual feedback interfered with processing of the gross spatial features of the distal responseeffects (theevents on the computer screen), but it did not prevent participants from learning about the subtle spatial features of the social response effects.
The position of an effect stimulus, on the left or right of the screen, can be processed more rapidly than the direction in which an effect stimulus is pointing. Therefore, it is likely that we detectedadifference between social and inanimate effect stimuli in the case of directional compatibility,b ut not in the case of positional compatibility,because the position of the effect stimulus triggered response-compatible or response-incompatible codes before processing of stimulust ype( social or inanimate) had been completed. In contrast, it is likely that processing of stimulus type wasc ompleted before the subtle, directional features of the effect stimuli had been encoded.
Responses were slower in the invisible condition, but only when the action effects were social. This unexpectedfi nding may indicate that participants imagined the perspective of the agent initiatingt he hand-shaking effects, but only whent he participants'own responses were invisible. Perspective taking may slow responses, and there is some evidence that difficulties in inhibiting knowledgea bout oneself can interfere with perspective taking (Carlson, Moses, &H ix, 1998; Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan, &H umphreys, 2005) . Therefore, it is plausible that perspective taking occurred only in the invisible condition, wherep articipants were deprived of direct visual feedback from their own actions.
In demonstrating that actions can be represented by their social, as well as their inanimate, effects, our findings areconsistent with Elsner and Hommel'smodel of effect anticipation (Elsner &Hommel, 2001 , 2004 and with the associative sequence learning (ASL) account of the origins and on-line control of imitation (Brass &H eyes, 2005; Heyes, 2001 ). Both of these models assume that action representations are formed through the operation of domain-general processes of associative learning, and therefore that responses can be represented by both social and inanimate effect stimuli. However, the representation of actionsbytheir social effects is particularly important in relation to the ASL model because it seeks to explain fundamentally social phenomena. This model suggests that individuals acquire the capacity to imitate predominantly via everyday experiencei nw hich their actions have first-person visual effectsw hich resemble the third-person appearance of these actions.E xperience of this kind is obtained from self-observation, opticalm irrors, and from being imitated.P revious studies have provideds upportf or the ASL model by showing that stimulus-response learning modulates bothimitativebehaviour and the neurological mechanisms thought to mediate imitation (e.g., Catmur,W alsh,&Heyes, 2007; Catmur et al.,2 008; Heyes et al.,2005; Press et al.,2007) .Inconjunction with Hommel's(2001, 2004) evidence that response-effect learning depends on associative mechanisms, the present study provides additional supportf or the ASL model by demonstrating under carefully controlled conditions that response-effect learning is not limited to inanimate effects, and that, in some circumstances, social effectsa re more readily integrated into action representations.
